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When problem situations are imprecise, peopl ~ . use mental processes closer to coping than to 
exact, logical-deductive reasoning. We sketch J~ew ways of explicating the process of coping. 
This leads to a broader definition of complexity than is generally used in computer science. We 
present as the essence of coping a normative model for shifting and changing focus of attention. 
To cope is to transform a complex situation into blurred representations that are simpler and 
less worrisome. The process, of "thinking of" such shifts in problem-representation is also 
improved when the level of specificity and precision in the focus of attention varies. 
Key Words: Inexact reasoning, Coping, Complexity, Attention, Representations, Precision, 
Blurring. 
1. Introduction 
As a person steers the course of his life from day to day, he spends more time 
"coping" than he does "reasoning" or "problem-solving". Yet, it is the attempt to 
understand reasoning which has most strongly motivated both descriptive and 
normative modelers. The long history of formal logic has had its greatest successes 
when it did not attempt to describe er pr,~scribe for human reasoning, much less 
coping behavior. The crowning achievements of modern logic lie in delineating its 
own logical limits. Steps toward a mathematical theory of evidence have been less 
spectacular since Leibniz's hope, three centuries ago, that it could be developed to 
the p•int where it helps lawyers. Yet, formal logic comes closer than any other 
mathematical structure to a normative model of reasoning. If its success in that 
endeavor has been less than perfect, that may be the result of its inapplicability to 
the "imprecise situations of real life"f7]. 
There have been many attempts t~ create normative models of how to reason 
or think rationally when we can only have approximate, partial or blurred 
knowledge of reality. The importance of the distinction between intuition and 
~A shortened and substantially different version of this article was presented at the IEEE 
Symposium on Fuzzy 'Sets and Applications in,New Orleans on December 8, 1977, chaired by M. 
Gupta. It was preprinted in the Proceedings under the title "Imprecision in coping and attending 
processes". Sections that diuplicate the earlier version are reproduced here with permission of the 
publisher. 
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rigorous analytic thinking and the need for both has been recognized for a long 
time [12, 24, 25]. Intuition enables us to ask questions or to ~ake bold assertions, 
while we prove our assertions in a more precise and algorithmic way, and research 
is the result of both processes [19]. Another approach has drawn a similar 
distinction between horizontal and vertical thinking [2]. Yet another approach 
that has led to impressive advances was based on the idea of a mixed strategy of 
making decisions in choosing by lottery [4]. The approach which has attained the 
greatest popularity, however, is Fuzzy Set Theory, the literature of which has 
grown to over 800 articles [8] since the first seminal paper appeared [28]. 
What is imprecise about the situations of real life is how they are perceived, 
interpreted and evaluated. The situation of the fleeing patron of a burning, 
crowded theater could be objectively measured by others with great precision. To 
him, the situation is vaguely threatening: he may not know ,exactly where the fire 
is or how serious it is; he may not know exactly how to get to the nearest exit, or 
the effect of his fleeing behavior upon all the others, or theirs upon him. He is 
unlikely to resort to reasoning in this situation, partly because he is not certain 
that reasoning will help him survive. (This is not to say that: he ought not to stay 
cool and resort to reasoning.) Yet many people can cope with such situations, and 
not necessarily only those with superior reasoning or precise thinking abilities. 
The more complex the situation, the more difficult it is to perceive with 
precision. Among the most complex social situations are those arising in the 
management of organizations or where several people with diverse world images, 
values, action styles are all critically involved. An example i.s how two or more 
rescuers can best help the victims of a disaster such as the burning theater. 
The study of behavior in such complex situations, both descriptive and norma- 
tive, should be central in the behavioral, social and information sciences (BSIS). 
Yet the more mathematical researchers in those sciences seem not yet to have 
found a promising line of investigation. One reason for this may be their striving 
for precision and their abhorrence of vagueness. Management scientists often 
model decision-making by a series of stages. These include problem-formulation, 
statement of objectives, fact-gathering and analysis, determination ~f feasible 
alternatives (optional courses of action), evaluation of alternatives, etc. Practicing 
managers often adopt as their ideal "management by objectives". The essence of 
this is goal setting. Vague and poor goal definition is widely regarded as a 
common flaw. It is to be avoided at all costs. Yet, too much precision and 
(apparent) clarity may be as ineffective as too much vagueness and confusion. The 
attempt to perceive a complex situation with an "inappropriately high" degree of 
precision and clarity may fail, with costly consequences. 
To clarify what is meant by an appropriate degree of precision in attending to 
and coping with complex situations we first try to show that to cope is to 
formulate or reformulate problem-statements corresponding to a worrisome 
situation in order to reduce its complexity. We then focus on one important kind 
of problem transformation, "blurring", and show how that can bi~ explicated with 
Enhancement of coping through blurring 39 
the help of concepts from Fuzzy Set Theory. We then investigate the process by 
which such problem-transformations ~re thought of and :ry to show that this 
requires an alternation of concentration on precisely specified aspects of a 
situation and relaxation that affords a more blurred an0 2uid image. This central 
attending process is conceptualized with the help of ideas from Fuzzy Set Theory. 
In doing this, we hope to illustrate the potential utility of Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) 
for BSIS's more.generally. We hope to suggest also that such "applications" can 
enrich the further development of FST. 
2. What does it take to cope? 
The term "coping" is widely used in ordinary discourse. But the concept has 
not, to our knowledge, been studied scientifically. We hope here to add some 
clarity to our understanding of what it means by showing that to cope is to 
formulate or reformulate "problem-statements" corresponding to a worrisome 
complex situation to reduce its complexity and worrisomeness. 
A recent article entitled: "Mathematics and computer science: Coping with 
finiteness" [16] comes closest to defining the term by its use in the sense intended 
here. Though the concept is essential for mental health professionals, the term 
"coping" doe,s not appear in the subject indexes of major books. Mention of it or 
research related to it is strikingly absent from the work supported by NIMH since 
1967 [26]. In an important study of how people say they handle worrisome and 
unhappy situ~xions [11], their responses to questions were categorized into three 
groups: passi~,e reactions (e.g., denial or taking one's mind off the situation, doing 
nothing, keeping on worrying); coping reactions (thinking things through,,attempts 
to alleviate, turning to formal or informal sources for help); prayer (e.g., mobiliz- 
ing internal resources, resignation). Thirty to forty percent of the respondents said 
they "coped". most of them by informal help-seeking, most commonly family and 
friends. Direct coping was found to be more common in men, younger people, the 
more educated and in those with higher incomes. 
To cope with a worrisome situation is to attend to it and to mobilize and 
organize the resources necessary to reduce its worrisome aspects. If the first step 
were to expertd time and effort to analyze, clarify, reduce what is worriscme about 
the situation into aspects that are precise, familiar and easily handled, as a 
scientific technician tries, ideally, to solve a routine scientific problem, then the 
situation could become more worrisome. It is not merely a question of the coper's 
limitations in clarifying the nature of the task or problem fecing him, nor the 
delay incurred by trying, but the basic limitation of how precisely the "worrisome- 
ness" of a complex situation can be perceived that bounds the use of an 
unimaginative., systematic approach. 
Consider the classi:al example of the tennis tournament problem: if there are n 
tennis players in a tc,urnament, how many contests must be played between two 
players, assuming no ties, with winners of contests playing one another ur,~:il a 
40 M.Kochen 
final winner emerges. A straightforward analysis of the problem, precisely as 
stated, is to say that in the first round there are ½n contests, in the second round 
~n, etc., for a total of ½n +¼n +½n + .  - • with examination of cases when n, ½n, etc., 
are not even. The problem-statement can, however, be transformed by noting that 
every player but the final winnerua single person--must lose in exactly one 
contest. Hence the number of contests is the number of losers, or n -  1. There is 
something less precise about asking for the number of losers at the end than 
asking for how many winners there are left at the ends of each round; it means 
thinking about the completed tournament in retrospect rather than describing 
how it progresses. What is even less precise is the mental process of "hitting" 
upon the idea of asking for a number of losers at the end. 
This example is often used to show that scientific creativity is far more than 
following systematic analytic procedures. The kind of problem-transformation 
used in this example might be called "passing to the negative". Another useful 
example of a problem-transformation, which involves both "passiag to the 
negative" and "blurring" was used to show the advantage of lateral (intuitive) 
over vertical (logical-deductive) thinking [2]. Here a girl is faced with the 
following worrisome situation. Her father's creditor wants to marry her against 
her will. She has agreed to participate in a lottery to decide her fate. The creditor 
meets her on a pebble-strewn path. He is to pick up a black and a white pebble 
and place them in his pouch. She is to select one of the two from the pouch. If she 
chooses black, she is to marry him, and her father's debt is absolved. If she 
chooses w,hite, she need not marry him, and her father's debt is also absolved. If 
she refuses to play, her father will be jailed. Sharp-eyed with fright, she catches 
the creditor picking two black pebbles and placing them in his pouch. How is she 
to cope? 
Ordinary, systematic analysis allows for no ingenious ways out. The problem 
may be "blurred" as follows. She picks a pebble but does not look at it. Instead 
she artfully drops it so that it gets mixed with the other pebbles on the path. Now 
she passes to the negative by saying: "How clumsy of me. But no matter. We can 
see what I dropped by looking at the pebble remaining in your pouch. It must be 
the opposite of what I dropped". 
The notion of "blurring", possibly one that is only superficially analogous to the 
above, has been scientifically studied in the context of vision [13]. It was found 
that a coarsely sampled and quantitized portrait could be recognized more easily 
after it is squinted at, defocussed, viewed at a distance. This has, of course, been 
practiced by painters for a long time. What appears to be happening is that noise 
bands which are spectrally adjacent to the picture's spectrum suppress recogni- 
tion. Thus, by dividing a photograph of Lincoln into squares and replacing each 
square by the average light intensity or density of that region in the original the 
resulting picture becomes very hard to recognize. "Ilais can be improved by 
removing noise near the spectral frequency of the picture (filtering past its Fourier 
transform and transforming back). 
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The improvement in recognition due to blurring is due to visual integration in 
the nervous system. In audition, people do worse in detecting a pure sine wave of 
any frequency when tiaere is a second sine wave of a frequency within an octave of 
the first one [29], aad removing such "noise" signals enhances detectability. 
Blurring, which removes the noisy signal, appears to help most when such noise is 
present. If a subject is presented with two figures that are sufficiently similar so 
that he has difficulty in discriminating them, say (and), then adjoining a noise 
signal that resembles one of them makes the discrimination task much easier, e.g., 
((vs)). But it resumes its former difficulty as the original and the noisy signal are 
separated. 
There may be fruitful analogies to situations such as the lottery involving the 
girl and her father's creditor; here a "noisy" signal in the form of the creditor 
picking up two black pebbles, as seen by the girl, is in the "spectral vicinity" of 
the main "signal", the color of the pebble chosen by the girl. To drop the chosen 
pebble, to be mixed with many others, is to remove the noise signal, to destroy 
unwanted information, which is what occurs in blurring. 
The analogy should not be stretched too far or perhaps taken too seriously. 
Cognitive blurring or inteilectt~al deiocussing may differ from perceptual blurring, 
of a forest--li~terally as in the case of 8 photograph or mosaic and figuratively as in 
the case of a complex puzzle facing a detective, scientist or doctor--only if we 
blur the trees, fuse the details so that they become subordinate to and coordinated 
into the whole. Even in the most complex of competitive board games, such as 
GO, experts know precisely what move they are going to make before they make 
it. By contrast, even in the simplest of zero-sum games, such as the one 
characterized by (-11 - as the payoff matrix for the player choosing one of the 
two rows (against a player choosing one of the two columns) the row-chooser does 
best, not by knowing precisely which row to pick and doing it, but by spinning a 
spinner on a disk divided into two sectors, one of which occupies ~ of the disc; if 
the spinner J[ands by chance in the smaller sector, he chooses the first row, 
otherwise the second. Neither he nor his opponent can know beforehand what he 
will choose. 
The spinner-disk device could be designed according to degrees of membership 
over the various sectors or according to a possibility distril~,ution. In this way, we 
can perhaps not only overcome the limitations of imprecision b,~t use imprecision 
to advantage, for enhancement. Neurophysiologists have beau.,,, io ask if this is not 
a principle according to which nervous systems might be organized. Social 
scientists who are skeptical of attempts to define cor, cepts such as "power"  or 
"consensus" with logical precision may find in the expressions of humanists (e.g., 
artists, novelists) more persuasive ways of capturing their basic concepts. 
The essence of how we cope is probably in how we attend to a situation. To 
attend to a situation means first to perceive, interpret and evaluate it. To reduce 
its worrisom,eness is to focus attention on those aspects of the situation that 
account for most of the worrisomeness. The more complex the situation, the more 
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imprecisely we tend to perceive, interpret and evaluate it, and the more difficult it 
is to focus attention appropriately. We are sometimes helped by deliberate lapses 
in attention focussing or by attention defocussing. When attention is focussed, the 
key question concerns the mechanisms controlling on what it is focussed, and 
these control mechanisms need not always be precise. 
3. What makes a situation complex? 
At least six ditticulties make a situation complex: (1) the difficulty of specifying 
the set of alternatives from which to choose a possible "solution" or coping 
actions; (2) the difficulty of specifying the set of properties a "solution" should 
have; (3) specifying, finding and using the knowledge that is necessary and 
sufficient--or at least helpful--in finding a "solution"; (4) bearing in mind the 
various deadlinesnmaintaining awareness about what to attend to at all times and 
when to do what; (5 and 6) realizing potentialities and constraints of information 
processing capacities and of psychosocial interactions. We show in this section 
that each of these difficulties is in the nature of making our perception and 
evaluation of the situation less precise, or that they call for shifts in point of view, 
and that efforts to make such shifts are hampered by excessive exactness. 
3.1 
To produce a set of alternatives or possible "solutions" for consideration 
requires creative ingenuity. In complex situations, that involve several people, it 
also requires the ability to resolve conflicts among diverse world-images and to 
shift viewpoint during the agenda-setting process. An example of a non-complex 
situation is that faced by a student trying to solve a well formulated problem at 
the end of a chapter in a textbook. The problem may be to determine if 541 is a 
prime number. The set of possible solutions is (Yes, it is a prime; No, it is not). 
The real problem facing the girl in the lottery involving her father and prospective 
marriage is mote complex because it does not exclude the crafty solution she 
eventually resorted to. 
The example of how two or more rescuers should cope with a disaster involving 
many victims may clarify the need to resolve conflicts in even more complex 
situations. Prior to deciding on a course of action, the group of rescuers may 
create an agenda; this may be explicit, as set by a leader who convenes them to 
organize their joint effort, or implicit when each rescuer pursues his own path in a 
kind of silent tzam work among people who work together well, or in a buzzing 
confusion among people who do not. A proposed set of options for the group to 
choose from depends on the proposer's point of view. One orientation, A, would 
lead one rescuer to propose the following alternatives for the group to choose 
from" A = {A l" Tend first to those who bleed most profusely; A2: Tend first to 
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those in greatest agony or pain; etc.}. A second rescuer with another orientation, 
B, might propose B = {BI: Tend first to those who, if they survive, are most likely 
to join the rescuers and help others; B2: Tend first to those likely to contribute 
most to society, etc.}. The proposer of A may nc, t have thought of B as a different 
way of perceiving the situation. He might be willing tc shift his viewpoint. If not, 
he might have to compromise with A or cope with potential conflict some other 
way. 
In any case, neither the point of view, nor the proposed set of options that 
reflect it, nor the alternatives within a set of options are completely precise and 
unambiguous. If they were, they might hinder rather than help in both the p ocess 
of reaching a group decision and in carrying it out by ruling out better solutions, 
such as the one adopted by the girl in the two pebble lottery. To articulate the 
point of view implicit in B as one that favors first aid to those of "greatest 
potential social utility" may engender more controversy, delay and result in 
greater overall loss of life than leaving it vague. To specify exactly what rate of 
blood loss, an excess of which justifies top priority attending to, may be impossi- 
ble or counterproductive to apply in practice. 
3.2 
To specify the set ot properties a "solution" should have, when more than one 
action is involved, may require the resolution of value conflicts. In the simple 
situation of deciding whether 541 is a prime, the property of the solution, namely 
the truth that 541 is a prime, is an explicit part of the problem statement. That is 
part of what makes it well-defined and simple. In more complex situations, the 
desiderata of an acceptable course of action are not always clear and if several 
actions are involved, they may be controversial. 
One rescuer may value a human life regardless of the goodness or quality of 
that life; if he had to choose between a victim bleeding profusely who is a known 
criminal or public enemy and another victim in great pain who is also dearly 
loved, he should tend to the one in greatest need first. Another rescuer may place 
greater value on lives of younger more creative people than on those of very old 
and dependent people. These values would influence a rescuer's preferences 
among a given set of alternatives. If two rescuers are to abide with a solution, or 
set of rules governing behavior, that is to apply to all rescuers, then they must 
somehow adjust these differences among value orientations. Differences in values 
are, however, seldom as sharp as partisans make them out. The main contribution 
to complexity lies in the imprecision of the perceptions and evaluations of the 
criteria for a good solution. 
3.3 
To specify, find, and use knowledge that is necessary and sufficient to find a 
"solution" rarely involves precision. We seldom know exactly what we need to 
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know until we are nearly face-to face with it. The knowledge itself is seldom very 
precise either. Only in simple problems, such as deciding if 541 is prime, is the 
knowledge or method needed implicitly specified in the problem--in this case by 
the location of the problem at the end of a chapter that aimed to teach the 
method. Prescribing the dosage of an intravenous solution of morphine to 
administer to a victim does not warrant a great deal of precision, for dosage- 
response relations, where known, are at best crude approximations. The complex- 
ity of the interacting biochemical systems on a person is such that an optimal 
dosage cannot, perhaps even in principle, be calculated with exactitude. 
3.4 
Timing of required actions is perhaps the greatest source of difficulty in a 
complex situation. We may have resolved to wear seat belts in a car or to refrain 
from smoking, but unless that resolution becomes salient and compelling at the 
precise moment we start to drive a car or experience the urge for a cigarette, it is 
of no value. If we don't think of starting a course of action in time to finish by a 
known deadline, we need not start it at all. The process of attending to something 
is critical to successful coping. It is far more difficult to attend to very precisely 
specified actions or states, especially if there is a great variety of these, than to 
attend to more vaguely specified states and actions, provided they are not too 
vague. The same applies to specifying the time when certain actions should be 
taken. Taking a prescribed medication at exactly 8:18 a.m. on a certain day is 
harder to attend to than taking it in early morning of that day. 
3.5 
Psychosocial and informational limitations as well as potentialities are realized 
only vaguely. Stress generated by agonizingly difficult choices may interfere with a 
decision-maker's ability to properly evaluate alternatives [14]. If the decision- 
maker is aware that risks of a situation are serious but has no hope of finding a 
solution, he will be under high stress and cope via "defensive avoidance"; if he 
has hope of finding a solution but doesn't have enough time, he will be under 
moderate stress and cope vigilantly, thoroughly searching, appraising and explor- 
ing all the alternatives. The best coping strategy is vigilant attention, with 
open-mindedness to both supporting and opposing information. People will do 
this if they believe that serious risks are involved, that a solution or good way oat 
can be found, and that there is enough time. Stress as the mediating factor is an 
inherently imprecise quality. It is a subjective feeling, even though physiological 
correlates such as heartrate, can be precisely measured. Similarly, awareness of 
one's information-processing limits is imprecise. Few of us can specify precisely 
and in general how much information input will overload our input or memory 
capacities. 
To cope with complex situations, then, is to perceive, recognize, evaluate it with 
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less than 100% precision and to mobilize, organize and bring to bear resources in 
ways that should not always be specified with great precision either. The most 
important aspect of coping is the ability to mobilize, 2 focus/defocus and shift 
attention to aspects of a situation that were previously only dimly or vaguely 
perceived. This process of shifting attention is executed by an executive controller 
at higher levels of the nervous system, and is in itself, subject to shifts in precision 
of attention focus. 
4. Attending processes 
When we observe a person shifting his attention, concentrating, going into a 
state of reverie, we regard his behavior to be governed by an attending process. 
To specify an attending process, we need to specify as functions of time: (1) what 
is being attended to: (2) the output of attending; (3) how what is being attended 
to is "kept in mind" aad (4) the instantaneous intensity of concentration. 
4.1 
What is attended to can be described at several levels. Let us arbitrarily select 
an ontological level at which the attender's state is specified by n variables, 
s l , . . . ,  s,, such as the brightness of a dot, and its location, the frequency of a 
sound and its intensity, etc. At a different level we might choose the number of 
victims in a disaster, the rate of each victim's blood loss, the number of rescuers, 
etc. With each state-variable is associated a secondary variable, relating it to the 
attender's perception of it. Thus, to sl are associated sa| A (sl, t) or the saliency of 
sl to attender A at time t, and affA (Sl, t), the affect of sl for A at t [15]. A 
attends to those state-variables at time t which, for him, have high saliency and 
high affect. What is attended to is an aspect of the situation, specified by the name 
(address) of a state-variable. 
To say that what is attended to is a state-variable, is to say that its values are 
monitored or tracked for a time. But what does it mean to monitor or keep track 
of a variable? Suppose that sl is the frequency of an acoustic signal. One level 
above that, there corresponds to sl another physical variable, such as the intensity 
s~' of vibration at a particular point on the basilar membrane of A ' s  auditory 
system. That may, in turn, be made to correspond to another physical variable sl" 
relating to concentrations of certain neurotransmitters and electrical potentials at 
2 In another study [17] 10 subjects were each asked 5 questions the answer to which they could 
provide only by looking them up in books through which they were able to browse, and in which they 
had seen the answers prior to being asked the q~:estions. Of the 50 problem-situations, only 28 were 
coped with by producing the right answer. Of the 22 remaining over 15 were the result of not thinking 
of asking for the book that contained the answer. 
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specific points of A ' s  nervous system. For A to attend to sl is for A's  nervous 
system to connect or couple channels at those points where s / '  can be observed 
with channels associated with a higher executive controller in the nervous system. 
Possibly, it is s / '  that is monitored or tracked, and though the correspondence 
between s / '  and s~ may not be 1-1, it is as if st were monitored. 
4.2 
To attend to sl, then, is to specify what channels should be connected to the 
channels of an executive controller. The output of an attending process is two 
fold. First, it is a signal indicating that the connection was made. Secondly, it is 
the value of a signal generated by a chain of internal stimuli starting from sl 
through that connection. It is the end result of the chain of signals "flowing 
through" the pathways thus created. The channels to be coupled may be recog- 
nized by their chemical signatures or their anatomical locations. 
4.3 
But how does the executive controller specify what to attend to? In line with 
modern psychological thinking we regard this as an active process, one initiated 
by A rather than one in which A responds or ~ eacts to some property of st. It is 
A who assigns a saliency and affect to each state-variable. A filters, at fairly low 
levels, the state-variables of their images and passes to an executive controller 
only those of high saliency and affect. Because the number of state-variables can 
be very large and their combinations even larger, there is likely to be considerable 
aggregation, even at lower levels. Thus, instead of frequency, light flux, etc., what 
is attended to is rate of blood flow, severity of pain. In addition to being 
aggregated, the state-variables are also "blurred",  as if they were squinted at in 
order to obtain a detail-suppressing overall impression, as discussed in Section 2. 
Thus, "bleeding pro[usely" becomes a general impression that is "kept  in mind" 
by an executive controller, which connects its channels not with one but with 
several other channels in a way that corresponds to a "fuzzy intention", enabling 
A to attend to victims who are bleeding more or less profusely. (The hedge "more 
or less" has been analyzed with the help of Fuzzy Set Theory.) 
The concept of intention is central. An intention is a statement, to which A is 
committed, about the properties of an adopted program that refers to that part of 
the program that has not been executed [18, 20, 21]. An intention as well as a 
program can be stated with a degree of care that varied from perfect specificity, 
precision, completeness, accuracy (consistency) to great generality, imprecision, 
incompleteness and inaccuracy or inconsistency. A non-fuzzy intention might be 
to monitor the blood loss rate of a particular victim while a fuzzy intention might 
be to survey the entire scene following the catastrophe to spot victims who seem 
to be most in need to help. Similarly, the value of a variable can be monitored, 
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kept track of with different degrees of precision and reliability. Thus, the I;leeding 
rate of a particular victim could be carefully watched with considerable precision 
at all times or simply glanced at occasionally to check if it is still profuse or 
slowing down. 
4.4 
When A concentrates on some aspect of his worrisome situation, he forms a 
precise intention that specifies carefully what is being attended to and he monitors 
these specified variables very carefully. The total energy and information proces- 
sing capacity that is available during a given time interval is fixed. Maintaining a 
connection to keep track of each variable and tracking with a given degree of 
precision takes a certain amount of these fixed resources. This amount increases 
with the degree of care or precision. Hence, the number of variables and the 
degree of precision are subject to trades. This corresponds to such laws as the 
Bunsen-Roscoe law: the intensity of a stimulus times its duration given rise to a 
constant number of dots that subjects respond to correctly 50% of the time, up to 
a critical point [10]. We can concentrate very intensely on a narrow aspect of the 
situation for a limited period of time and this may lead to great feats in which the 
mind functions as an algorithmic processor, proving conjectures. But this narrow- 
ness may blind the mind to other, totally different, approaches or perceptions of 
the situation. We can also relax, and switch from intense concentration to very 
playful fuzzy attending. In those periods, some minds may leap to great intuitive 
insights to create bold, often fuzzy, asso.rtions, to ask profound questions. 
The attending process may play a major role in how we cope with complex 
situations. How we attend to those aspects of a situation we find worrisome, how 
we select a set of alt,-,native courses of actions, etc.Mabove all how we switch 
back and forth between attendance with sharp concentration and fuzzy 
relaxationwmay determine how effectively and efficiently we reduce the worri- 
someness of a situation. 
5. Reduction ot complexity 
When a worrisome situation is not terribly complex, it is not difficult to perceive 
it '  witb the kind of precision required for successful use of reason or vertical 
logical thinking [2]. As we have tried to show in the preceding section, the more 
complex a situation, the more fuzzy its perception, interpretation and evaluation. 
Consequently, coping is more likely than precise reasoning to help reduce the 
worrisomeness, because coping involves perceptions and responses with a more 
appropriate degree of fuzziness or imprecision. We should like in this section to 
present some arguments for this proposition. 
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Perhaps the simplest idealized example of a minimally complex situation is that 
of determining whether a given large number n is or is not a prime. This could be 
transformed into a worrisome situation by suitably challenging and motivating a 
group of mathematicians, giving them appropriate deadlines, amplifiers to their 
information-processing abilities (e.g., computers, programmers, literature sear- 
chers, assistants, etc.). The problem is decidable and known to be computationally 
very complex. For example, to test if n = 2128 + 1 has a factor (useful for designing 
certain codes in space communication) by testing one after the other up to 
d2~28+ 1 would take about 2000 years on a high-speed computer [16]. With the 
help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, the smaller prime factor was found 
to be 59, 649, 589, 127, 497, 217 after about 1½ hours of computer time [16, 22]. 
This computation time still increases exponentially with n. It is an inherently 
complex problem to find a prime factor. 
The notion of compl~':ity we introduced in Section 2, however, goes considera- 
bly beyond the way complexity is defined by computer scientists. T~e problem of 
whether n is a prime is ir~ that sense complex only because of property [4], 
bearing in mind that there are deadlines and [5], that information processing 
capacities are constrained. It is simple in that (1) the set of possible solutions, (2) 
the properties a solution should have and (3) the knowledge necessary to find 
s o m e  solution are precisely specified. The computational complexity is, however, 
sufficiently great to affect these aspects, j! 
To cope with this complex situation, the mathematicians may decide ito trans- 
form the problem. They may change the original set of possible solutions from 
(No, Yes) to (No, Possibly, Probably, Very probably, Almost certainly, etc.), by 
the following method. They "guess" a number between 2 and 4-n and test if it 
divides n. If it does, they are certain that n is not a prime. If it does not, they 
hypothesize, or assert with uncertainty, that n is a prime. If they find this 
uncertainty still too worrisome, they guess a second, different number between 2 
and d-n and repeat the test. Finding that neither number divides n, they are more 
certain. If the residual certainty is still too worrisome they proceed to a third trial, 
until the residual worrisomeness of the situation has been reduced to a level they 
can accept. 
There is an image of mathematics as a field of study that is so exact that only a 
zero level of residual uncertainty will do. That this is unrealistic is apparent from 
the complexity of modern proofs: when a proof is sufficiently long and involved, 
the probability that its author or those who checked it made no errors at any point 
is no longer zero. Even with the help of computers, which have already played an 
important role in major mathematical problems (e.g., settling the 4-color conjec- 
ture) the residual uncertainty should no longer be regarded as strictly zero. Thus, 
even in the most exact of the sciences, there are situations in which coping is more 
appropriate than traditional, precise reasoning. 
Consider the following algorithm (see Fig. 1) for coping with the determination 





uncertainty that n 
END: n is not a prime 
Replace k by k+l 
Fig. 1. An algorithm for “guessing” whether a number is prime. 
of whether n is prime. Let Fn,k be the fuzzy set of numbers, between 2 and n, 
other than x1, . . . , xk7 specified by the membership function: 
mFm, x = ( ) 
0 if x=x1 or x2 or ’ ” or xk, xs2, x>& 
the strength of belief that x divides n. 
We may interpret m(x) as specifying the weights or sector sizes of a spinner to 
be used for selecting a value of x with a “probability” or degree of membership 
that is proportional to some mathematician’s intuition that x divides n. Call the 
outcome & + 1. Fuzzy set theory gives little guidance about how to determine this 
function, though it helps to derive implications about it. 
The complexity of this algorithm is clearly much less than the best that can be 
done by number theoretic techniques aimed at removing all the uncertainty. The 
computing time need increase no faster than n log n. Thus, coping, which is 
essentially dealing with the less than perfect exactness of how we perceive, 
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interpret, evaluate complex situations, can be effective in reducing certain aspects 
of complexity. 
Of all the ways of transforming or reinterpreting a situation or problem- 
formulation, how can a group of copers arrive efficiently at one that works? What 
can lead mathematicians to replace a time-honored striving for either (No, Yes) as 
possible answers to "Is n prime"? by (No, Possibly, Probably, etc.)? What can 
lead the girl in the two-pebble lottery to replace (Pick a pebble and look at it, 
Refuse to pick) as the set of possible actions in her predicament by adding to 
these choices the action she took? Under what conditions does a group of rescuers 
act nearly spontaneously ~s a team to perform heroically in coping with the effects 
of a disaster while others bog down in chaos and strife? An answer probably lies 
in the manner in which the copers attend to the various aspects of the situation. 
Focussing attention too rigidly, too intensely and for too long on one representa- 
tion of the problem--e.g., mathematicians locked into the (No, Yes) alternative 
searching for special properties of the number whose primeness is in questionm 
may be counter-productive. 
6. On the development of Fuzzy Set Theory: interactions with "applica~ons" 
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) is a mathematical theory or a tool rather than a 
scientific theory because it lacks an empirical/experimentalt foundation. It has 
been claimed that possibility theory may stand in the same relation to FST as 
probability theory stands to measure theory. Yet, anything corresponding to 
mathematical statistics has yet to be developed. The development of FST is likely 
to mature if it deals with some particular problems that present the theory with 
unique challenges. The problem of clarifying progress for attending to complex, 
worrisome situations is such a problem. Study of that problem is as likely to 
enrich FST and deepen our understanding of the problem. It is more appropriate 
to treat FSD as a means to an end, such as clarifying this important scientific 
problem, rather than an end in itself. A scientific understanding of attending 
processes is likely to require some understanding of how memory and control 
organizes itself in our central nervous system. General principles according to 
which "memory" organizes itself might arise from the use of formalisms using 
analogies to thermodynamic nets in physical chemistry [5, 9, 23]. If FST could 
help in the formulation of these principles, it would thus be greatly enriched. But 
general principles still allow for many possible alternative implementations and to 
find the alternative "chosen" by nature requires a detailed study at the level of 
neural nets and neurobiochemical pathways (e.g., [6]). We may, at best, find FST 
necessary but not sufficient in advancing our understanding of major scientific 
problems. 
Attending processes can be studied experimentally at several levels. There are 
simple designs of psychological experiments to test whether people who use 
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blurring or defocussing mechanisms can under certain conditions cope better than 
people who use precise algorithms. Attention-shifting can be studied at a 
physiological level by observing eye-movements and extending techniques used to 
probe short-term memory and tracking behavior. At a molecular level, one can 
search for specific molecules on the surfaces of neurons that enable them to make 
the selective functional contacts suggest,~d by the coupling model described 
previously. Here a key question concerns the level of specificity of such molecules, 
a notion similar to fuzziness [1]. 
The straightforward "application" of FST to the pebble problem with the 
choices (Pick a pebble and look at it; Refuse to play) does not help the girl out of 
her double bind, in which no matter what she daes she loses. FST has not yet 
matured to the point where it can help tc, explain how the girl could invent the 
third option: "Pick a pebble but don't lc,ok at it and drop it". Once the third 
option is included, its superiority to the other two options is obvious, and FST is 
not needed to prove that. 
Yet, models for coping and attending processes may suggest further exercises 
for sharpening the tools oi FST, particularly the type of FST developed by Saaty 
[27]. An example of a problem in attention that illustrates the use of FST is 
furnished by how to divide one's attention between three reports--A, B, and C. 
The attender may judge B to be half as salient as A, and C just as impgrtant. The 
eigenvector of the reciprocal pairwise comparison matrix is (0.25, 0.50, 0.25). The 
attender may view B as five times as emotionally charged as A and C on a par 
with A; the eigenvector of that matrix is (0.45, 0.09, 0.46). If asked to compare 
saliency and affect, he may give affect twice the weight, resulting in the eigenvec- 
tor (2/3, 1/3). Multiplying 
0045)( 09 \ /0 .3167~ 0.3633 •0.25 . 2/3 
) gives [ [0.50 1/3 
~0.25 0146 \0 .3200]  
as the weights assigned to A, B, C. He should pay most of his attention to B. 
The notion of complexity is likely to become very central, and may lead to new 
characterizations of vagueness both in perception (input) and the specification of 
action (outout). Similarly, the concepts of worrisomeness may best be captured by 
explicitly using its fuzziness. Tt¢ ideas contributed in this paper constitute a step 
toward such a clarification and illustrate a useful way to develop Fuzzy Set 
Theory. 
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